In its recent judgments in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v.
INTRODUCTION
American courts over the Guantánamo prisoners and not with the substance of their cases, namely the legality of their detention. Controversial central elements of the government's post-September 11 detention policies thus remain unexamined by the highest American court.
None the less, the Supreme Court's decisions do establish some general guidelines for the review of terrorist detentions and have had significant practical repercussions for the proceedings at issue. Yet as these guidelines are worded rather broadly, a dispute as to their correct interpretation has already arisen and it seems almost inevitable that the court will at some stage have to revisit some of the issues raised by the three cases.
Underlying the government's line of reasoning in all three cases is its designation of the detainees as so-called 'enemy combatants'. This article therefore starts with a short discussion of this category, which is not one recognised in international law, and the legal consequences the government has attached to this categorisation. This is followed by a summary of the justices' findings in the three 'enemy combatant' decisions. Next, the article explains what the Supreme Court did not say, identifying several key issues which the court did either not touch upon at all or refer to only summarily. Finally, the practical consequences of the judgments for those currently detained as 'enemy combatants' are evaluated.
'ENEMY COMBATANT' STATUS
The US government has designated the American citizens José Padilla and Yaser Hamdi as well as the foreign prisoners at Guantánamo Bay as 'enemy combatants'. 8 Yet, as the Supreme Court observed in the Hamdi case, it 'has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such.' 9 What seems to be common to these 'enemy combatant' classifications is the government's endeavour to thereby prevent having to make a choice between either granting the detainees prisoner-of-war (POW) status under the Third Geneva Convention or charging them with a criminal offence. In practice, persons described as 'enemy combatants' have been detained without charge, interrogated and denied both access to legal counsel as well as the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.
In international humanitarian law the term 'combatant' denotes the right to participate directly in hostilities. 10 Lawful combatants may not be prosecuted for taking part in a conflict, are the terms 'unlawful' or 'unprivileged combatant '. 11 These are generally used to describe persons taking part in hostilities without being entitled to do so; they can be prosecuted simply for their participation in an armed conflict and are not entitled to POW status upon capture.
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The denial of POW treatment -normally implied by the use of the label 'unlawful combatant' -is apparently the primary purpose of the 'enemy combatants' qualification in the case of the Guantánamo prisoners. Any detainees recognised as POWs could not be compelled to give any further information than their name, rank, date of birth and identification number and would have to be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities. 13 On 7 February 2002, the US President determined that neither the Taliban nor the al-Qaeda detainees are entitled to POW status. 14 As far as clearly identified alQaeda members are concerned, the conclusion that they do not qualify as POWs seems justified. For fighters not forming part of the armed forces of a state are only entitled to POW treatment if they fulfil the conditions, listed in Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, of (i) being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (ii) having a distinctive sign recognisable at distance; (iii) carrying arms openly; and (iv) conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. At least the last, and possibly the second, of these criteria seem not to apply to al-Qaeda members. For Taliban soldiers, however, the situation is different. In their case, the US government has claimed that they did not effectively distinguish themselves from civilians nor conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war and did therefore not fulfil the conditions of Article 4(A) (2) . 15 Yet at least the Afghan Taliban fighters arguably represented the armed 11 See K. Dörmann, 'The Legal Situation of "Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants"', (2003) The most contentious element of the President's decision to deny POW treatment to the Guantánamo prisoners is, however, its blanket nature, encompassing all captives irrespective of the particular circumstances of their cases. This stands in stark contrast to the cautionary rule of Article 5(2) of the Third Geneva Convention which provides that:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has pointed out, the determination as to the legal status of each internee needs to be made on an individual basis. 17 The US government's refusal to do so constitutes the backdrop to the Rasul case.
In the cases of the US citizens Padilla and Hamdi, the designation as 'enemy combatants' seems to have been mainly designed to circumvent the procedural safeguards applicable in normal criminal procedures. Both of them have been held for more than two years without being charged with a criminal offence; they have been denied access to a lawyer as well as judicial review of their detention. The criteria used by the US authorities to determine whether terrorist suspects are held as 'enemy combatants' or charged with a criminal offence are unclear. Other American citizens allegedly involved in terrorism, for 18 Lindh, who had been captured fighting alongside the Taliban, was sentenced to 20 years in prison as part of a plea agreement; Ujaama, who allegedly had links with al-Qaeda, also entered a plea agreement and was sentenced to a two-year prison sentence; Moussaoui has been charged with a number of terrorist offences for his explanation for this inconsistent policy would seem to be that the evidence against those described as 'enemy combatants' is not strong enough for a criminal prosecution. This makes it all the more important that such detention without charge on national security grounds is at least subject to judicial review. The right to be free from arbitrary detention, entailing a right to challenge the lawfulness of detention in court, is guaranteed by a number of international human rights standards, including Articles 9(1) and 9(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by the United States. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged as forming part of customary international law. 19 The availability of this right and details concerning its exercise form the central contentious issues in both the Padilla and the Hamdi cases.
3.
WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAID O'Connor held, requires that 33 Ibid., 476. 34 A 'plurality opinion' is an opinion lacking enough judges' votes to constitute a majority, but receiving more votes than any other opinion. See B. Garner (ed.), Black's Law Dictionary (7 th ed., 1999) 1119. In the present case, Justices Souter and Ginsburg dissented with part of the plurality's reasoning but concurred in the judgment. 35 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2640. 36 In Quirin, the court held that '[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of ... the law of war." See 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942). 37 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2640-42. 38 Ibid., 2648. a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.
[…] At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.
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Such concessions to the executive could, for example, include the admission of hearsay evidence and a presumption in favour of the government's evidence. Furthermore, the requirement of an independent review could also be met by an 'appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal'.
40 Whatever the precise procedural standards, O'Connor concluded, Hamdi has never been given an opportunity to rebut before a neutral decision-maker the factual assertions underlying his classification as an 'enemy combatant'.
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A minority of four judges rejected the government's position already with regard to the first, more fundamental, issue concerning the government's authority to detain US citizens as 'enemy combatants'. Justices Souter and Ginsburg held that the AUMF does not constitute such an authorisation. However, as there was insufficient support for a ruling holding the detention illegal, they concurred in the judgment, which at least allows Hamdi to challenge his detention in the district court. 42 Justices Scalia and Stevens made a similar argument but dissented. They opined that there are only two alternatives for detaining American citizens accused of fighting against the United States: either they have to be prosecuted for treason or some other crime, or Congress has to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. As neither element was fulfilled in the present case, the detention of Hamdi was not justified. 43 Only Justice
Thomas supported the government on both contentious points. In his dissenting opinion, he argued that the detention of 'enemy combatants' falls within the executive's war powers and that the judicial branch lacks the expertise and capacity to review the government's determinations in this field. international law has not been clarified. On the contrary, some of the court's comments seem to raise more problems than they solve.
Does International Law Matter?
In international human rights law makes clear that the duty to respect the right to be free from arbitrary detention and to challenge the lawfulness of detention in court applies whenever a state exercises authority and control over a person, regardless of where the detention occurs.
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None the less, there is not a single reference to international legal sources to be found in the whole of the Rasul decision.
At the same time, it should be stressed that Rasul does not explicitly dismiss the relevance of international and foreign law for the American legal system either. Apparently, the Supreme Court's majority, by accepting the detainees' claims on the basis of a line of reasoning anchored in US law, did simply not find it necessary to enter into a discussion of international law. Furthermore, both the Hamdi plurality opinion and the minority opinion drafted by Justice Souter do refer quite extensively to the United States' obligations under international humanitarian law. In sum, while there is nothing in the 'enemy combatant' decisions which would suggest that the Supreme Court is moving 'toward a more cosmopolitan constitutional jurisprudence', 64 the court has not decisively closed the door on the possibility of such a development either. This rather ambiguous attitude towards international law probably reflects the split of the justices' views on this delicate question.
When Can War Powers Be Used Against American Citizens?
By remanding Rumsfeld v. Padilla on technical grounds, the court has avoided dealing with the merits of the case in which the government is asserting the most far-reaching powers. If the administration is right, it could capture US citizens on American soil -far from any battlefield and unconnected to any traditional armed conflict -and detain them indefinitely as suspects, wherever they are, is that anyone suspected of terrorism could be shot dead at first sight -whether on an Afghan battlefield or in a Detroit supermarket. Thus, Padilla's case concerns the claim which lies at the heart of the US administration's counter-terrorism policies: that there is a global 'war on terrorism', from Afghanistan to New York and from Iraq to Chicago, justifying extraordinary executive competencies free from judicial interference.
The Supreme Court's findings in Hamdi suggest that also in Padilla's case the government will hardly be able to continue to refuse an independent review of his detention.
Yet the fundamental question of whether the President is, in principle, authorised to use war powers on American soil against US citizens suspected of terrorist involvement remains unanswered. As Justice O'Connor stressed in her plurality opinion in Hamdi, the court in that case only confirmed the executive's authority to militarily detain US citizens falling into the narrow category of individuals who, allegedly, were part of or supporting enemy forces in Afghanistan and engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there. 65 Whether this authority extends to terrorist suspects who are confronted elsewhere than on the Afghan battlefields, whether something like a 'war on terrorism' exists -these questions will remain unresolved for some time. Padilla's lawyer has to re-file in the correct district court and it will probably be a year or two before the Supreme Court revisits his case and addresses these key issues -provided the government does not charge and prosecute him in the criminal courts in the meantime.
The Hamdi opinions do, however, offer some hints of the Supreme Court judges' views on these broader questions. It is safe to assume that the four justices who rejected the government's position on its authority to detain US citizens as 'enemy combatants' would rule in favour of Padilla. And even O'Connor seemed to suggest that she would probably stick to a traditional conception of armed conflict according to international humanitarian law and not endorse the detention of suspected terrorists for the duration of a broadly defined 'war on 
What Should Future Habeas Proceedings Look Like?
While the Supreme Court held that both Hamdi as well as the Guantánamo prisoners have the right to bring habeas corpus proceedings in American courts, it did not go into any details with regard to the procedural and substantive standards which should govern such proceedings. In the Rasul case, the court simply stated that ' [w] hether and what further proceedings may become necessary after respondents make their response to the merits of petitioners' claims are matters that we need not address now.' 68 The Hamdi decision at least offers a few hints of how the procedure by which 'enemy combatant' detention can be challenged could look like.
Who Can Sue When Where?
One of the open questions concerning the habeas proceedings to come is whether this right will be available to foreign citizens detained elsewhere than at Guantánamo Bay. Justice any point in time between one day and half a year, or even more, after his capture. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the timing of the decision to continue to detain someone is within the complete discretion of the military. In how far is the custodian allowed to delay the determination? Sooner or later the courts will have to clarify these questions.
When doing so, they should be guided by relevant standards of international human rights law: Article 9(4) of the ICCPR, for example, entitles any person detained to challenge the lawfulness of his or her detention in a court 'without delay'. 
What Kind of Due Process Standards Do Apply?
As far as the due process requirements in the habeas proceedings to come are concerned, the Rasul decision offers no guidance whatsoever. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Hamdi, by contrast, sketches out a process which she called 'a basic system of independent review' 76 and which Justice Scalia criticised as 'an unheard-of system' based on 'constitutional improvisation'. 77 Indeed, the problem underlying the plurality's approach is that, having concluded that the executive is, in principle, authorised to detain citizens as 'enemy combatants', it tried to make up for the executive's failure to apply due process protections by itself establishing the needed procedures. All the plurality seemed to rely on when drawing up this system is the endeavour to find a fair balance between the due process rights of detainees and the government's interest to protect national security. The result of this balancing act is the broad outlines of a process which would be highly deferential to the executive:
Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus, once the Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria.
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As, apart from unspecified 'screening' processes and military interrogations, Hamdi had received no process at all, the Supreme Court had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that its proposed basic review standard was not satisfied in his case. Yet it is not evident how compliance with this standard would be assessed in less clear-cut cases or, indeed, in the ordered review proceedings in Hamdi's case. What, for example, is 'credible' and 'more 75 The suggestion is Ronald Dworkin's: see R. persuasive evidence' respectively? Does it count as a 'fair opportunity for rebuttal' when the detainee has to search for evidence or witnesses in the Afghan desert? Is any hearsay evidence acceptable, irrespective of its source?
The Hamdi plurality's rough sketch of a possible review system is further obscured by its similarly vague proposition that the neutral decision-maker before which 'enemy combatants' must be allowed to challenge their detention need not necessarily be an ordinary 
PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES
The most important consequence of the Supreme Court's decisions in Hamdi and Rasul is that all those being held by the United States as 'enemy combatants' -whether American citizens or not -must now be given the opportunity to challenge their detention in US courts. As explained in the previous section, the decisions leave, however, some room for interpretation 78 with regard to the specifics of the relevant proceedings, and the battleground between the government and those representing the detainees is now shifting from the basic question as to the existence of a right to judicial review of 'enemy combatant' detention to the more specific issue as to the exact standards which should govern these procedures. The government's purported first steps to implement the court's decisions, reviewed below, and the reactions they provoked with the detainees' lawyers and human rights advocates suggest that the new controversy will be just as vigorously fought out and protracted as the dispute which led to the decisions at hand and might well equally end up in the Supreme Court.
Padilla
For José Padilla, the Supreme Court's decision in his case means that, for the moment, he And, as explained above, the courts' interpretation of the evidential standards sketched out in the Hamdi decision could be of decisive importance in the habeas proceedings of alleged 'enemy combatants' to come.
Hamdi
How the process to challenge 'enemy combatant' classification advanced by the Supreme Court in the Hamdi decision would work in practice will never be tested in his own case. 87 The government stated that Hamdi was freed because 'considerations of United States national security did not require his continued detention', without giving any reasons for the suddenly changed assessment as to his dangerousness. 88 The thought suggests itself that his release was as a reaction to the Supreme Court's decision, especially as the negotiations leading to the agreement had been taken up immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment. 89 Apparently, the government believed that the evidence against Hamdi would not be sufficient to meet even the lenient standard required by the Hamdi plurality and preferred to free him rather than to explain in court why he was designated as 'enemy combatant'.
The Guantánamo Detainees (Rasul)
After almost three years of detention, it is still not clear how much longer the Guantánamo prisoners can and will be held. 
The Combatant Status Review Tribunals
The DoD reacted swiftly to the Supreme Court's decisions and, only ten days later, issued an order establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals. 90 The order applies to the foreign citizens held at Guantánamo Bay, giving them the opportunity to contest their designation as 'enemy combatants' before these new review tribunals. 91 The tribunals are each composed of three military officers, one of whom must be a judge advocate. 92 The detainees are not permitted the assistance of lawyers in the proceedings before the tribunals but are instead assigned military officers as 'personal representatives' to assist in connection with the review process. 93 The detainees can be excluded from parts of the proceedings if their presence would compromise national security, 94 and are allowed to call witnesses only 'if reasonably available'. 95 The tribunals are not bound by the rules of evidence which would apply in ordinary courts and are free to consider any information they deem 'relevant and helpful', including hearsay evidence. 96 They determine by majority vote whether a detainee is properly detained as an 'enemy combatant'. The standard used for this determination is 'preponderance of evidence', but there is a rebuttable presumption in favour of the government's evidence. 97 Referring explicitly to the passage in O'Connor's Hamdi opinion which suggests that a military tribunal might satisfy the due process requirements articulated by the Supreme Court, the DoD claimed that the newly created tribunals would comply with the court's rulings. 98 Yet human rights groups decried the establishment of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, which started functioning on 30 July 2004, as an attempt by the DoD to subvert the Supreme Court's decisions. 99 While the DoD expressly acknowledged that the tribunal proceedings do not preclude detainees from seeking review in US courts, 100 the human rights groups feared that the outcomes of these proceedings (which would normally be in favour of the government) would be used as evidence in the ordinary court proceedings, thus deterring careful scrutiny and restricting the scope of court review. 101 The government's returns to the first habeas corpus petitions on behalf of Guantánamo detainees suggest that that is indeed its strategy. 102 However, several elements of the tribunal proceedings let it appear as questionable whether courts which would rely on the records emerging from these proceedings would comply with the requirements established by the Supreme Court for the judicial review of 'enemy combatant' detentions.
Firstly, and most importantly, the plurality in Hamdi held that 'he unquestionably has the right to access to counsel' in his further review proceedings. 103 This is in line with the findings of international human rights bodies that an effective exercise of the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention is dependent on access to legal representation. 104 The 'personal representatives' assigned in the proceedings before the Combatant Status Review 
The Civilian Courts
There are thus good reasons to argue that the military review process should not be allowed to somehow restrict or even replace the judicial review of the Guantánamo detentions by the ordinary US courts. This civilian review process is now also under way. At least 50
Guantánamo prisoners have filed habeas corpus petitions in the District Court for the District of Columbia; at the time of writing, the first decisions were still outstanding. 110 Without entering into speculations about the outcome of these proceedings, it is important to note that, depending on the courts' interpretation of the vague 'basic system of independent review' put forward by the Hamdi plurality, the government could find itself in a very advantageous position. Cases are often won and lost on the burden of proof, and according to Hamdi the government would only need to put forth 'credible evidence' that a detainee is an 'enemy combatant'. Thereupon, the burden would shift to the detainee who would have to prove that he was never affiliated with the Taliban or al-Qaeda -a task which might be extremely difficult, especially as it might involve finding witnesses or evidence in Afghanistan. Thus, much will depend on how the courts construe the vague standards formulated by the Hamdi plurality in practice, in particular how exactly they define and apply the threshold test as to the production of 'credible evidence' by the government. with international fair trial standards as set out, in particular, in Article 14 of the ICCPR. 114 In addition, the impartiality of the military officers selected to hear the cases has been called into question. 115 There is no indication in the decisions at hand as to whether the Supreme Court would uphold trials carried out by the commissions under these conditions.
The Military Commissions

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's fundamental finding that, even when the executive is claiming that it is engaged in a war, the judiciary still has a role to play, is a significant and welcome statement.
Judicial review is not only an integral component of the prohibition against arbitrary detention but also an important safeguard against torture or other inhuman treatment. Abu Ghraib and the fate of the so-called Iraqi 'ghost prisoners' stand as a stark reminder of what terrible consequences the removal of detention from independent oversight might entail. 116 In its 'enemy combatant' decisions the court made clear that, at least on US territory and in places where the United States exercises 'complete jurisdiction and control', it will not tolerate such legal black holes. International law would have required the court to go even further and state the same with regard to any persons under the authority and control of US state agents.
At the same time, there is a danger that the procedural rules suggested by the Supreme Court could make the judicial review of 'enemy combatant' detentions as deferential to the government as to render it all but meaningless. In addition, the court's upholding, in principle, of the executive's authority to detain 'enemy combatants' captured abroad means that, at least for the moment, the government is not forced to make a choice between charging the detainees with a criminal offence and according them POW status under the Geneva
Conventions. Rather, it can continue to hold them without charge or trial while denying them the benefits and protections due to POWs. It is exactly this creation of a special category of detainees, not envisaged by international law, which is at the bottom of the most important controversies surrounding the government's treatment of suspected terrorists.
While the Supreme Court could, of course, not be expected to establish rules for every imaginable aspect of the 'war on terrorism', it has missed the chance to impose on the executive a clear framework, based on standards of international law, which would govern the detention of alleged terrorists. Some of the justices' comments even raise new questions which will occupy courts and tribunals on all levels. Hence, although the Supreme Court's decisions represent a step towards increased judicial involvement, the legal battle over the rights of 'enemy combatants' is far from over. 
